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Innovation systems in developing countries are different from those in mature OECD 
countries in a number of ways. They need to cater for different needs; they build on 
institutional frameworks that tend to be much less formalised, and rules that are less 
enforceable; and their key agents and the incentives that determine their behaviour tend to be 
very distinct.  
 
The innovation systems literature2 explicitly recognizes that policies needs to be context-
specific. Institutions develop in response to changing economic and social conditions, and 
vice versa. The choice of technologies depends on initial socio-economic conditions, and, as 
technological learning is cumulative in nature, the decisions that are taken at the start of 
evolutionary processes give rise to particular trajectories. As Nelson (1994) has put it, 
technologies, industrial structures, and supporting institutions co-evolve. This explains why 
technological knowledge is deeply rooted in the specific institutions of societies, and its 
content and availability vary across societies, even when factor endowments are similar.  
 
A growing body of literature deals with innovation in developing countries – not least thanks 
to the series of GLOBELICS conferences. This article shows that (despite the fact that 
context-specificity is recognised in principle) this literature, with few laudable exceptions, 
fails to appreciate some important peculiarities of developing countries. In particular, it does 
not systematically address the specific needs for poverty reducing and socially inclusive types 
of innovation. Distributional effects of policies are rarely ever investigated. Furthermore, it 
tends to overestimate the role of governments as agents of resource allocation and to 
underestimate  the importance of improving basic institutions of the market economy 
(competition, contract enforcement, entry and exit conditions, financial intermediation). 
Governments are often implicitly assumed to be benevolent entities that are only, or mainly, 
driven by their wish to maximise social welfare (even though their limited implementing 
capacity is often recognized). This assumption starkly contrasts with findings from research 
on neopatrimonialism and the rent-seeking state in developing countries (e.g. Eisenstadt 1973; 
Loewe et al. 2007).   
 
As a consequence, partly inappropriate policy conclusions are drawn. For example, policies 
are biased towards micro and meso level interventions with limited outreach (science parks; 
incubators) rather than reforms of basic market institutions (governance of financial markets; 
simplification of entry for new firms). A similar bias exists towards the State as the main 
                                                 
1 German Development Institute, Bonn 
2 I refer here to the body of literature that goes back to new institutionalist and evolutionary research approaches 
(Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1988; Nelson/ Winter 1982) and stresses the role of intangible investment in 
knowledge accumulation and systemic characteristics of technological development.  
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coordinator and implementer of activities to foster innovation, neglecting the potential of 
private corporations, non-governmental organisations, or public-private partnerships as 
process facilitators and programme implementers. Moreover, science and technology policies 
should be reoriented from their current focus on R&D towards engineering capabilities; from 
the pursuit of “new to the world” innovations to technology diffusion; and from supporting 
modern urban industries to the development of innovations that improve the livelihoods of the 
poor.      
 
This article consists of three main chapters. Chapter 1 undertakes to identify the key obstacles 
for innovation in developing countries, emphasising the specifics of this group of countries 
vis-à-vis industrialized countries and pinpointing those aspects that tend to be underrated in 
innovation systems research. In doing so, it deliberately draws on different strands of 
academic literature beyond the neo-institutionalist innovation systems literature. In Chapter 2, 
policy implications are drawn, again pinpointing those aspects that complement or even 
contradict the mainstream debate in innovation systems research. Chapter 3 distils the most 
relevant limitations of the ongoing innovation system debate with regard to developing 
countries and identifies elements for future research. 
 
 
1.  Specific challenges for innovation policy in developing countries 
 
Innovation matters for low income countries as much as it matters for developed countries. 
Developing countries are characterized by low incomes resulting from low average 
productivity. This reflects their limited capacity to develop new, or to adopt and improve 
upon existing, technologies. 
 
The group of countries that is usually labelled “developing” is quite heterogeneous e.g. in 
terms of per capita income, technological advancement, and quality of institutions. Many of 
them have made remarkable progress with regard to building up manufacturing capacity and 
integrating in global trade. As a group, developing countries have increased their share of 
global manufacturing exports to 30% in 2006 (UNCTAD 2008). 
 
A large part of this success however was achieved by a limited group of countries. In her 
book “The Rise of the Rest”, Amsden (2001) identifies twelve countries that have acquired 
considerable manufacturing experience: China, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey. The vast majority of 
developing countries is much slower in developing manufacturing capacity. Moreover, even 
in the case of Amsden’s fast industrialisers, the rapidly expanding industrial base does not 
necessarily reflect a similar advance in terms of technological and innovation capacities. In 
fact, the ability to produce “new to the world” innovations and knowledge-based assets which 
are difficult to copy and therefore enable their owners to reap innovation rents is still 
something quite exceptional3 in these countries (e.g. Altenburg/ Schmitz/ Stamm 2008 for 
China and India). The increase of manufactures in the industrial structure of developing 
countries that are classified as “knowledge-intensive” does not contradict this; the bulk of 
knowledge-intensive manufactures in these countries is still carried out by, on behalf of, or 
under licensing agreements with, leading Western corporations. Manufacturing shifts to the 
South, but cutting edge R&D follows only slowly and to very few locations.  
 
                                                 
3 With the exception of South Korea and Taiwan which have developed strong innovative industries.   
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This article focuses on the typical developing countries that belong to the low and lower-
middle income group and are not included in Amsden’s “rising rest”. Their low incomes 
reflect low levels of productivity, and they typically suffer from manifold institutional 
weaknesses. Enormous differences exist within this group in terms of country and market 
size, level of income and human development, technological capabilities, etc. What is more, 
divergence both in terms of overall levels of development and in terms of technological 
capabilities has increased substantially over the past decades. Nevertheless, the group of 
“other” (not fast industrialising) developing countries shares many characteristics that clearly 
set them apart from the high-income, highly diversified and research-intensive OECD 
countries. The following analysis highlights some important characteristics of this group of 
countries from the perspective of innovative capabilities. Moreover, it underlines those 
aspects that, although important from a policy perspective, are often overlooked, or at least 
underestimated, in recent studies on innovation systems. What follows are, of course, stylised 
facts. It goes without saying that practical policy-making at the country level needs to go 
beyond such generalisations and take the distinctive features of each individual country into 
account.    
 
The analysis starts with the argument that innovation policies need to set targets and priorities 
that substantially differ from those in rich countries (1.1). It further addresses specific 
weaknesses of important formal institutions, such as rules and regulations that ensure 
competition, determine levels of entry and exit of firms, and allow financial markets to 
provide appropriate signals to investors (1.2). Special emphasis is given to the argument that 
developing countries tend to have limited capabilities to design, implement and monitor 
complex policies - an argument that challenges over-ambitious expectations towards the 
developmental state (1.3). The analysis also points out specifics of the firm structure (1.4).   
 
 
1.1  Different targets and priorities  
 
The main distinctive feature of developing countries is poverty. With the Millennium 
Development Declaration, all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development 
institutions agreed to increase their efforts to achieve eight goals by the target date of 2015, 
including to halve extreme poverty, to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS and to provide universal 
primary education.  
 
This has two implications for innovation policy: First, there is a political commitment to 
increase the social expenditure as well as investments in other basic infrastructure and 
services that are directly related to the Millennium Development Goals (e.g. roads, 
electricity). This reduces the scope for investments in innovation programmes that are less 
directly related to poverty reduction, and it explains at least partly why the share of R&D (and 
other innovation efforts) in GDP is much lower in developing than in developed countries. 
Second, a substantial part of those funds that are specifically earmarked for supporting 
innovations should be targeted to activities that help to create sustainable livelihoods and 
increase the incomes of the poor (Utz/ Dahlman 2007:105). Potential candidates are R&D for 
improved agricultural yields, water management and sanitation, or the development of cures 
for tropical and poverty-related diseases. The challenge is not primarily to develop “new to 
the world” innovations, but the development and broad dissemination of affordable and 
adapted technologies.  
 
Underlying the most visible poverty impacts are, of course, deficits in economic productivity 
and competitiveness. To foster innovation as a driver of productivity development and, hence, 
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higher incomes is therefore at least as relevant for developing countries as it is for 
industrialized countries. Still, there are strong arguments to prioritise activities that are 
directly relevant to the poor over others that mainly cater to the needs of the better-off.  
 
This does not necessarily exclude investments in advanced technologies. For example, science 
and technology efforts in modern industries may help to develop competitive advantages in 
international trade and to substitute costly imports. Even hi-tech developments for exclusive 
markets – e.g. building up an aircraft industry in Brazil or a space industry in India – may in 
the long term contribute to poverty reduction if they generate overall economic growth and 
technological spillover effects. This, however, needs to be clearly demonstrated. Prestigious 
national technology projects – such as space technology in India, car manufacturing in 
Malaysia, or nuclear power technology in North Korea – often put a heavy burden on public 
finances, and many of them are unlikely to pay off in terms of socially balanced economic 
development.  
 
Moreover, technologically advanced projects often have negative distributional effects. The 
value chains of technologically sophisticated products usually imply high entry barriers at all 
stages – from R&D to production and marketing – and therefore benefit only small segments 
of (mainly urban) highly skilled workforce and wealthy enterprises. The costs of technology 
development on the other hand will largely be borne by national taxpayers. If innovation 
policy involves protection of domestic producers, national consumers have to pay a markup 
compared to free import prices.  
 
Take the example of Malaysia’s “National Car” project. Taxpayers contribute to national 
subsidies for the automotive industries, such as Vendor Development Schemes, and import 
duties are levied on imported cars to ensure a competitive domestic price of the “National 
Car”, Proton. Consumers thus have to pay a higher price for cars. The respective rents accrue 
to the Proton company and its Joint Venture partner, Mitsubishi, as well as a small number of 
supplier companies. In short, rents are transferred from taxpayers and consumers to a small 
group of protected private industries and a Japanese multinational. This may be a reasonable 
investment in national capacity building, provided that new competitive activities are 
generated in the long run. In Malaysia, despite more than two decades of protection, this has 
not been achieved. The Malaysian International Trade and Industry Minister recently 
acknowledged that public efforts to expand the local automotive industry, with emphasis on 
the national car, had not yielded the desired results.4 For example, the component costs of 
domestic components for the Proton are 50% higher than in Japan.5 Likewise, the Indian 
space programme has been heavily subsidised since the 1950s and still has not produced 
commercial success (Baskaran 2005).  
 
Technological developments may have still other negative spillovers for the poor. The recent 
wave of investments in biofuels for example has increased food prices, which falls especially 
heavy on the poor. Labour-saving technologies may crowd out many job opportunities, e.g. 
new retail technologies that economies of scales and supermarkets at the expense of 
traditional mom-and-pop stores. Hence a trade-off exists between the need to catch up with 
international technological practices and the need to protect specific interests of the poor. 
 
In sum, innovation policy in developing countries should protect specific interests of the poor. 
The challenge here is to build inclusive and poverty-oriented innovation systems: “inclusive” 




in terms of ensuring that the percentage of workforce and enterprises involved in innovative 
activities increases; and “poverty-oriented” in the sense that the technologies developed help 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Another key challenge is to reduce the 
technological gap vis-à-vis industrialised countries, bringing average productivity levels 
closer to international best practices. Investments in national technology capabilities should 
focus on operating and on design and engineering capabilities for transforming existing 
knowledge into new configurations (Bell 2007: 48ff.). Technology adoption, adaptation, and 
diffusion play a much greater role than original R&D-based development of cutting-edge 
innovations. Moreover, the opportunity costs of investments in technology project need to be 
taken into account, particularly in developing countries that face a strong moral obligation to 
put poverty alleviation first. Also, indirect poverty effects and distributional effects should be 
considered – the latter are likely to be regressive.  
 
Innovation research so far rarely addresses poverty and distributional effects of science and 
technology policies. Out of several hundred papers contributed to the first five GLOBELICS 
conferences, for example, only two explicitly address poverty reduction in their title. Where 
specific sectors are investigated, these focus more often on the development of knowledge-
based competitive advantages in globalised industries (electronics, automotive) than on pro-
poor solutions. The question who benefits from innovations and who bears the costs 
(including hidden costs via taxation or inflated consumer prices) should be addressed in any 
study on innovation policy in developing countries, but I am not aware of any systematic 
effort in this direction. 
 
 
1.2  The weakness of formal institutions  
 
Institutions shape economic behaviour. According to North (1990), institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society, or, to put it differently, the human devised constraints that determine 
interaction. Institutions comprise both formal rules and laws and informal norms and codes. In 
economic life, institutions have in important role in reducing transaction costs.  
 
Key institutions in modern and competitive economies are markets. Markets first and 
foremost build on competition as a key driver of innovation. Policies that promote 
competition are central to raising productivity. These include anti-monopoly laws, fairly open 
trade policies, and measures to relax the entry and exit of firms.  
 
The productivity performance of firms in a given country is usually distributed as shown in 
Figure 1a (see e.g. Bloom/ van Reenen 2007: 1353). In a competitive situation, the more 
productive firms, on the right side of the curve, will earn innovation rents, and the least 
efficient firms on the left side will be driven out of business. Over time, the average 
productivity and income increases. Several mechanisms drive this shift (see e.g. Klein/ 
Hadjimichael 2003: 23):  
 
– technological learning: existing, but less efficient, firms will try to emulate the good 
performers;  
– entry and exit: new innovative firms will enter the business using more productive 
methods, challenge and eventually replace established ones; 
– mergers and acquisitions: the market for corporate control provides a better match of 
resources – business ideas, assets, human capital, finance. This market can be can be 
conceptualised as “an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage 
corporate resources (Jensen/ Ruback 1983); 
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– flows of finance and human capital: The financial system transfers money to the best 
performing  companies, and skilled workers move to where they can earn more.  
 
These mechanisms of competitive selection are the major driving forces of innovation in 
market economies. Its dynamic however presupposes the smooth functioning of the 
underlying selection mechanism. Bloom/ van Reenen (2007) for example show that the “tail 
end” of less productive firms disappears faster if product market competition is strong. Most 
importantly, competition should not be hampered by monopolies; entry of newcomers should 
not be restricted to protect incumbents; exit of firms should not be held back by inappropriate 
bankruptcy laws; and resources should be allowed to float freely from less to more 
remunerative activities. Especially financial markets have a key role as a signalling device 
that helps to channel resources to activities with the highest returns.   
 
In developing countries, formal rules and laws are less well developed and, more importantly, 
their enforcement tends to be unreliable and arbitrary. Moreover, governments influence 
resource allocation in many ways – in part as well-intentioned efforts in the pursuit of 
developmental goals, e.g. to strengthen activities that are expected to generate important 
spillovers, in part to favour politically connected entrepreneurs, clans, industries, or regions, 
or to extract rents for themselves. In the real world, both motives may often be interwoven. 
The results of such interference rarely stimulate innovative behaviour. IFC’s series of Doing 
Business Reports shows that the governments of less developed countries tend to impose the 
heaviest administrative burdens on firms. Especially cumbersome licensing procedures 
hamper the entry of new firms (World Bank/IFC 2007). Moreover, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade limit the entry of foreign competitors; financial and labour markets are often 
heavily regulated, and superposed by informal rules that distribute credits and jobs according 
to criteria other than efficiency; state monopolies and arbitrary pricing policies protect 
domestic firms from private sector competition; severance laws to protect small privileged 
groups of formal sector workers hamper labour mobility, etc. (Biggs/ Srivastava 1996; Botero 
et al. 2004). Even those policies that are explicitly intended to strengthen national industries 
rarely lead to success. Lall (2000: 31), for example, summarises the results of industrial policy 
in Africa as “abysmal”. 
 
The lack of fair and efficient legal institutions is another key problem. It makes contract 
enforcement very difficult and increases investment risks and transaction costs. Informal 
institutions that are based on trust and reciprocity can only partly substitute binding economy-
wide rules, and they often systematically exclude outsiders. As a result, long-term investments 
are discouraged, and entrepreneurs induced to concentrate on activities that promise quick 
returns (e.g. import trade rather than manufacturing). Likewise, firms tend to avoid 
dependence on other firms, either by producing in-house or importing from abroad. This 
reduces the benefits of inter-firm specialization and interactive learning and leads to typically 
short value chains (Dussel Peters/ Piore/ Ruíz Durán 1996).  
 
Innovation systems research tends to underestimate the importance of markets and market-
enhancing institutions. The effects of administrative entry barriers for small firms, financial 
sector regulation, markets for corporate control, competition policy, labour market regulation, 
etc. on firm productivity are an important subject of traditional neoclassical economic 
research (de Soto 1989; Djankov et al 2002; Botero et al 2004, Levine 1999), but not 
addressed systematically in the neo-institutionalist and evolutionary research community. 
Reviewing for example the lists of GLOBELICS conference papers or recent editions of 
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pertinent journals6 these topics rarely appear. What is more, the neoclassical research is rarely 
quoted, or challenged.  
 
Innovation systems research builds on new institutional economics. As such, it relaxes overly 
rigid assumptions of neo-classical economics and introduces institutions as constraints. 
Markets are conceptualized as embedded into complementary non-market institutions. As 
Cimoli et al. (2006) put it, “non-market institutions (ranging from public agencies to 
professional associations, from trade unions to community structures) are at the core of the 
very constitution of the whole socio-economic fabric. … they offer the main governance 
structure in many activities where market exchanges are socially inappropriate or simply 
ineffective.” Consequently market failures – e.g. collective action problems, asymmetries in 
information markets – occupy a centre stage in research. This is not least because innovation 
research focuses on information, knowledge, and learning  – all domains where market failure 
is especially pervasive. Studies rightly emphasise the non-rival and non-excludable character 
of information, increasing returns to information, the tacit aspects of knowledge, etc. 
(Greenwald/ Stiglitz 1986). As a consequence, a strong research focus is placed on the role of 
non-market institutions. A growing body of literature deals with knowledge brokerage and 
network building, the role of university-enterprise linkages, science and technology parks, and 
other public support mechanisms for technology transfer and learning.  
 
Innovation systems research has great merits for addressing the complexity of innovation as a 
systemic process that is embedded in manifold institutions (many of them non-market !) and 
therefore develops along unique trajectories. This allows to focus on the quality of institutions 
and their functionality for technological learning. With regard to trade policy for example, 
innovation systems research has shown that it is not so much the degree of openness to trade 
and foreign direct investment that explains performance, but the ability to take advantage of 
them in terms of technological learning (Fagerberg /Srholec 2005: 44), and it has provides 
insights on how to shape institutions in order to exploit positive spillovers.  
 
With its focus on non-market institutions, the innovation systems research risks to lose sight 
of market-enhancing institutions that are key for any national innovation system, most notably 
competition policy; financial sector governance; regulations of firm entry and exit; labour 
market regulation; and rules for corporate control. Neo-institutionalist perspectives are needed 
to understand how these institutions interact with national innovation systems and how they 
should be shaped to enhance technological learning. Otherwise, policy agendas will continue 
to be influenced by traditional neoclassical research that overestimate the capacity of 
deregulated markets as drivers of innovation. The politically highly influential Doing 
Business reports by World Bank/IFC are a case in point (for a critical appraisal see Altenburg/ 
von Drachenfels 2006; Arruñada 2007). 
 
 
1.3  Less effective and accountable governments  
 
Innovations are prone to market failure. Governments thus have an important role in 
overcoming these market failures and fostering the development of competitive advantages. 
This holds especially for developing countries. As shown in Chapter 1.1, innovation policy in 
these countries needs to address poverty problems. Many of these problems are unlikely to be 
solved by market forces alone, e.g. the empowerment of poor people or the provision of basic  
health services. Governments thus have a role in, for example, disseminating information, 
                                                 
6 E.g. Research Policy; Industry and Innovation; Technovation.  
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supporting grassroots innovators, creating specific incentives for researchers to provide 
knowledge inputs to the poor, or setting up funds to acquire rights to pro-poor technologies 
(see e.g. Utz/ Dahlman 2007: 117 ff).  
 
It would be naïve, however, to assume efficient welfare-maximizing bureaucracies. Industrial 
and innovation policies are always prone to political capture (Pack/ Saggi 2006; Rodrik 
2004). Studies on the political economy of the State highlight that the latter is an autonomous 
entity that pursues its own interests. On the one hand, bureaucrats benefit from expanded 
State activities and therefore have a strong incentive increase their scope of activity. “Since 
bureaucrats derive utility from higher salaries and greater power of their bureaux, it is rational 
for them to maximise the budget of their bureaux rather than to optimise the social output.” 
(Chang 1996: 22). On the other hand, interest groups may influence public regulation for their 
own benefit. The State may thus be conceptualised as an arena within which economic 
interest groups or normative social movements struggle for the allocation of funds and the 
shaping of regulations in a way that benefits them (ibid: 20). Moreover, even if the selfish 
interests of bureaucracies and the influence of interest groups are “assumed away”, there are 
serious doubts about the ability of states to take appropriate decisions that improve innovative 
performance.  
 
Industrial and innovation policies thus necessarily carry the risk of government failure. This is 
not an argument against such policies; but it calls for careful consideration whether the 
expected benefits in terms of corrected market failures can be expected to be greater than the 
costs of government intervention in terms of expenditure plus eventually decreased 
effectiveness of distorted markets.  
 
This applies to industrial and innovation policies anywhere. In developing countries, however,  
the risk of government failure tends to be much greater than it is in mature democracies. First, 
the ability of administrations can be expected to be lower as these have fewer resources and 
are less well-organized. Second, and more importantly, there tend to be fewer checks and 
balances. In mature democracies, policymakers are held accountable through a variety of 
instruments  by democratic bodies (e.g. parliaments, political parties), an independent 
judiciary, general accounting offices, compulsory evaluation routines, taxpayers 
organizations, and an independent press. Such institutions of control are often weak and not 
fully independent.  
 
This applies not only to authoritarian regimes. Many of the formal democracies in developing 
countries are categorised as “defective” (Merkel/ Croissant 2004) or “hybrid regimes” 
(Diamond 2002) in the sense that they combine democratic and authoritarian elements. In 
such systems, the exchange of favours between politicians and interest groups is a widespread 
phenomenon. Politicians and bureaucrats often use access to public funds as a means to 
stabilise their power. As bureaucracies are often poorly financed, and submitted to fewer 
controls, corruption is more widespread. All this greatly increases the risk that government 
programmes are “captured” by politicians, bureaucrats and/or industrial elites. The World 
Bank indicators for “government effectiveness”, “regulatory quality” and “control of 
corruption” show a very clear pattern, whereby OECD countries occupy the upper percentiles 
and developing countries the low percentiles (Kaufmann/ Kraay/ Mastruzzi 2008). 
 
It is therefore not surprising that only a relatively small number of success stories are reported 
from developing countries where government action has been instrumental to spur new or to 
strengthen knowledge-based activities. These examples mostly come from middle-income 
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countries that rank fairly high on governance effectiveness indicators (e.g. salmon farming in 
Chile; aircrafts in Brazil; electronics in Malaysia).  
 
Innovation systems research on developing countries largely shares the view that “in contrast 
to the neoclassical position that the removal of governments restores economic efficiency, it is 
the strengthening of governments that is needed to make markets work properly” (Lall 2000: 
34). Most studies identify numerous market failures and claim a more active role of public 
policy, often providing lists of desirable corrective government policies (e.g. contributions to 
Muchie/ Gammeltoft/ Lundvall 2003). It is mostly acknowledged that few governments of 
developing countries are capable of applying sophisticated policies, whereas the willingness 
of governments to act in the best long-term interest of broad-based technological learning 
seems to be taken for granted. The risks of government failure in terms of waste of funds, 
corruption, additional red tape, crowding out of private service providers, or further distortion 
of incentive systems are rarely addressed. Hence it is implicitly assumed that more state 
activity is normally conducive to innovative development.  
 
This assumption needs to be tested. While there is no doubt that even weak states have a 
certain role in correcting market failure,  the limitations of political systems with few checks 
and balances need to be part of a comprehensive policy analysis. The challenge is to design 
innovation policies in a way that reflects the ability of governments and the risks of political 
capture. In many poorly governed developing countries this may mean to favour instruments 
that are relatively simple and easy to monitor (e.g. self-targeting ob beneficiaries, 
simplification of procedures), non-selective (because selection of beneficiaries may be 
arbitrary) and implemented through non-governmental channels (private service providers, 
business associations, NGOs). Further research is needed to define appropriate sets of policies 
for countries with different levels of government effectiveness.  
 
 
1.4 Less diversified and integrated firm structures 
 
The structure of the private sector in developing countries and its performance differ strongly 
from those in industrialised countries. This reflects largely different framework conditions 
including, for example, weaker legal systems (less secure property rights, less reliable 
contract enforcement, higher transaction costs), different demand conditions (considerably 
lower purchasing power, demand for fewer and less sophisticated products, often small 
market size), deficient infrastructure (higher transport and production costs), weaker 
education systems (from primary education to vocational training and universities), and 
higher macroeconomic and price volatility. Many of these conditions hamper innovations. 
While a comprehensive analysis of specific features of private sector development in 
developing countries and its innovative capacities is beyond the scope of this paper,7 five of 
the most striking characteristics shall be highlighted due to their implications for specific 
innovation policies.  
 
First, the sectoral composition of the economies tends to be different and less diversified. 
The economy, and exports in particular, often depend to a great extent on agriculture and 
extractive industries. Manufacturing is mostly dominated by simple consumer goods for basic 
subsistence (food, clothing) given that the vast majority of consumers only demands a limited 
range of standardized products. Policy therefore needs to emphasise economic diversification.  
 
                                                 
7  For an overview see e.g. Tybout (2000).  
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Second, the private sector engages less in innovation, in particular of the “new to the world” 
and “new to the market” type (according to classification provided by OECD 2005). Most 
firms are limited to non-innovative purchase of technology or minor improvements (Bell 
2007: 25). Enormous productivity leaps can be achieved by bringing average productivity 
closer to international best practice. The focus of innovation policy should therefore lie on 
diffusion of existing technologies that are nevertheless new to firms in developing countries. 
Likewise, research and development should not be seen as the main input to innovation; 
instead, innovation in these countries is an “engineering-centred” process (ibid.: 28), and 
capabilities should mainly be developed that enable forms to incorporate and upgrade existing 
technologies. 
 
Third, informality is a widespread and increasing phenomenon. Figure 1b shows that the 
distribution of firms according to their levels of productivity differs from the model 
distribution 1a that has been verified for industrialised countries.8 Several specifics are 
remarkable. First, there are two productivity peaks, reflecting the co-existence of two 
segregated subgroups of firms. The majority of firms – generally micro and small firms in the 
informal sector – display considerably lower levels of productivity than the rest of the firms. 
Second, productivity in the less efficient group hardly increases, whereas the more productive 
group does increase its productivity. As van Biesebroeck (2005) observes, “transitions 
between size classes or movements in the productivity distribution are very slow (…). Large 
firms remain large, and more productive firms remain at the top of the distribution. Smaller and 
less productive firms have a very hard time advancing in the size or productivity distribution.”  
 
This suggests that the Schumpeterian dynamics of creative destruction – whereby more 
efficient new firms challenge incumbents and drive less efficient firms out of business, and 
resources are reallocated to the higher productivity end – does not work well in developing 
countries. Why is this the case? Empirical evidence shows that entry and exit happens very 
frequently. In fact, small firms in developing countries are short-lived. The striking 
phenomenon  is that great numbers of new informal enterprises enter the market with the 
same obsolete levels of productivity as those that exit.  
 
Mead (1994) provides a plausible explanation for the finding that poor countries tend to have 
many start-ups without increasing productivity. He distinguishes between “supply-push” and 
“demand-pull” entrepreneurship. While “demand-pull” entrepreneurs are “pulled” into 
entrepreneurship because they have a business idea that challenges incumbents and promises 
high returns on investment (the “Schumpeter effect”), “supply-push” entrepreneurs are pushed 
by unemployment. Poor unemployed people create new micro-enterprises or become self-
employed in order to compensate for the declining family income, even if they see market 
opportunities for their activities getting worse. “Supply-push” enterprise formation is 
symptomatic for poor developing countries lacking social safety systems. As founders of 
firms typically lack specific skills and seed money, their economic activities are restricted to 
traditional activities with low entry barriers, which translate into over-supply, fierce price 
competition and very low profits. As a result, not only exiting firms but also entering firms 
are often less productive than incumbents on average (Tybout 2000:28), and high firm 
turnover is coupled with stagnant productivity. So far, the implications of this segregation for 
the formation of integrated national innovation systems have not been investigated. From a 
                                                 
8 For lack of consistent and reliable data the curve is not based on consistent data sets; rather, it has been 
constructed in a stylised way from different sources, e.g. van Biesebroeck (2005) for Africa and Weller (2000) 
for Latin America. Both studies confirm that productivity differentials between small and large firms are 
enormous and widening, as productivity in micro and small firms hardly increases.  
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policy perspective, support mechanisms are needed to reduce the (currently widening) 
productivity gap and to ease the transition of firms towards the high end of the productivity 
distribution.  
 
Forth, levels of specialization and interaction among firms are low. The availability of 
domestically produced intermediate and capital goods is often limited, thereby leaving firms 
with the choice to conform with low quality inputs, to integrate vertically, or to import. In 
addition, market volatility and the difficulties to enforce contracts make inter-firm 
cooperation risky. As a result, value chains tend to be short and incomplete. Most firms sell 
directly to final customers (Tybout 2000: 17). Although some cases of impressively 
innovative enterprises can be found in developing countries, these typically remain isolated 
and encapsulated, lacking linkages with complementary dynamic enterprises upstream and 
downstream in the value chain and with specialized technology institutions (Arocena/ Sutz 
2001: 58). Hence they fail to give rise to national clusters or broader patterns of 
specialization. The In fact, local clusters of small enterprises tend to be less specialised 
internally than their counterparts in rich countries (Altenburg/ Meyer-Stamer 1999). Hence 
inter-firm cooperation – one of the key drivers of technological learning in industrialised 
countries – is comparably weak. The policy challenge is thus to strengthen inclusive value 
chains and diffuse technological learning from existing “islands of efficiency”. 
 
Fifth, the share of FDI in total fixed capital formation tends to be high, especially in high-
productivity sectors (Bell 2007). Foreign corporations play an important role as their 
productivity levels tend to be far above average and they may be a valuable source of new 
technology for local firms. Foreign firms may bring in technological know-how, marketing 
and management skills, export contacts, reputation. Conversely, they may also discourage 
domestic technological efforts if they are far superior to their local competitors. A number of 
econometric investigations using firm-level data have been carried out in order to verify to 
what extent such spillovers occur in developing countries. Their findings are quite diverse and 
depend on the country and sectors examined (Görg/ Greenaway 2004). Aghion et al. (2006) 
show that the effects depend on initial capabilities of incumbents. For innovation policy it is 
crucial to understand when the entry of foreign firms encourages and when it discourages 
technological learning, and to improve the absorptive capacities of local firms as business 
partners in value chains or joint ventures.   
 
In sum, innovation systems research needs to take the peculiarities of developing countries in 
terms of firm structure and dynamics into account. More research is needed to explain the 
barriers to technology diffusion towards the informal sector. Despite several decades of 
discussion on the informal sector there is still no consensus on the reasons for its astonishing 
persistence. While neoclassical economists emphasise labour market segregation and 
administrative entry barriers as the main reasons, structuralists conceptualise informality as 
multidimensional, stressing lack of access to education, information, capital, and others (see 
Chen 2004 for a literature review). Future research should look into knowledge flows and 
barriers within the informal sector and between formal and informal firms.  
 
 
2.  Key elements of innovation policies for developing countries 
 
As the analysis in the previous chapter has shown, the needs and conditions for innovation 
policies in developing countries are quite different from those in mature industrial economies. 
This chapter draws policy conclusions that result from the specific features of innovation 
systems in developing countries.  
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Developing countries are often trapped in a vicious circle where poverty limits the scope for 
investments in innovative capacities as well as for building up efficient institutions; the lack 
of efficient and accountable institutions in turn creates incentive structures that favour rent-
seeking rather than innovations. The role of the state is thus ambivalent: On the one hand, a 
greater role is required to compensate for pervasive market failures; on the other hand, 
overregulation and political capture of scarce public resources are especially common in these 
countries. This diagnostic calls for a heterodox reform agenda that combines elements of 
deregulation, public sector reforms, and selected pro-active government programmes.  
 
Many policy needs are similar to those in developed countries. As in developed countries, 
there is a need to support product differentiation and sectoral diversification since 
development is path-dependent on the opportunities opened by the capacities generated by 
previous activities. The public sector has an important role in dealing with the information 
and coordination externalities inherent to new activities.  The following paragraphs however 
address key elements that are specific to, or at least especially relevant for, developing 
countries.   
 
Especially in poor countries, innovation policy should focus on inclusive innovations and 
their diffusion. Innovations are inclusive if they benefit the poor in terms of additional 
income and employment. Although creative destruction is part of the process of innovation, 
the emerging productive activities that replace less efficient ones should be accessible for 
poor people. Especially relevant are innovations in those areas where poor people live and 
work, e.g. a focus on upgrading of agriculture (incl. forward and backward linkages, post-
harvest handling etc.). Moreover, policies should focus on outreach. Many selective industrial 
and innovation policies benefit only small percentages of the target population – e.g. a few 
dozen industrial clusters at the village level, but hardly all villages – since the number of 
beneficiaries is limited by the amount of subsidies. Moreover, these programme are often not 
sustainable as they expire when governments run out of funds (Committee of Donor Agencies 
2001). New approaches instead intend to develop markets for enterprise services, e.g. 
subsidies are channelled through commercial providers. This enables users to choose between 
different providers; competition puts pressure on providers to offer good quality and behave 
in a customer-oriented way.  
 
The focus of policies should shift from selective micro or meso level interventions to 
improving the functioning of basic market institutions : improved governance of financial 
markets, competition policy, simplification of business procedures, property rights reforms, 
labour market reforms, etc. It has been shown that these institutions are important to speed up 
the process of learning and shifting resources to more productive uses. Also, improvements in 
these areas may benefit firms across-the-board, rather than few privileged beneficiaries. It is 
important to note, however, that this does not call for wholesale deregulation. Institutions are 
to be designed in a way that triggers technological learning in a socially inclusive way. With 
regard to labour market policy, for example, cutbacks of excessive obligatory severance 
payments me required on the one hand (because they induce labour market rigidities) while it 
may be necessary to create new incentives to invest in human capital, on the other.   
 
The role of non-governmental agents as policy implementers and drivers of change 
should be encouraged. Formulating and implementing successful sector policies requires a 
“highly capable, coherent economic bureaucracy closely connected to, but still independent 
of, the business community” (Evans 1998: 66). As shown in the previous chapter, this 
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capability can not be taken for granted; and more importantly, governments may use their 
mandate and resources to increase the political power or even extract personal rents.    
 
Non-governmental agents are therefore a promising alternative for developing public goods. 
One option is full or partial privatisation of basic services (World Bank 2003). Services may 
be delivered through Non-Governmental Organisations. In India and Bangladesh, NGOs 
already play an important role as facilitators of rural innovations. The Self-Employed 
Women`s Association’s Trade Facilitation Centre in India engages in market research, 
product development, capacity building, development of software in local languages and a 
number of networking activities (Utz/ Dahlman 2007: 123). Likewise, international networks 
of not-for-profit organisations (e.g. Global Initiative for the Eradication of Malaria; Global 
Research Alliance) complement or substitute functions of national innovation systems. Last 
but not least, private corporations provide innovation services on a non-commercial basis, 
sometimes as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility Engagement, partly encouraged 
through   matching grants schemes. While non of these non-governmental agents can and 
should fully substitute sovereign governments, they can play important complementary roles. 
More research should be devoted to exploring the role of these actors in national innovation 
systems. 
 
Governments should always be held accountable for policy outcomes. It has been shown 
that developing countries lack checks and balances. As a consequence, politicians and 
bureaucrats can, and do, employ public programmes in exchange for political or material 
favours. Establishing checks and balances should be a conditio sine qua non especially in 
countries where favouritism is widespread.  
 
Due to the scarcity of public resources, the risk of political capture and the need for public 
legitimacy, it is especially important that decisions about sectors and activities to be supported 
are based on a fair amount of research and experts opinion, considering a range of views and 
options (Bullock/ Mountford/ Stanley 2001: 14). Once decisions have been made, they should 
be subject to continuous, automatic monitoring and independent third-party evaluation. 
Monitoring and evaluation must be guided by prior defined performance criteria and 
benchmarks and include the views of all stakeholders. Performance should be measured in 
terms of outcomes rather than outlays. 
 
Furthermore, bureaucracies require incentives to improve their performance, e.g. to increase 
their customer-orientation and ensure business-like service provision. Getting the incentives 
right seems to be much more important than creating new organizations. Such incentives 
include to separate funding from service delivery; to encourage competition among service 
providers; to define conditionality and sunset clauses so that barriers for removing benefits 
will not emerge and policies remain flexible to changing needs.   
 
 
3.  Conclusions for the study of innovation systems in developing countries  
 
The previous chapters have revealed some gaps and biases in the current academic debate on 
innovation systems in developing countries. Three aspects are particularly worrying and call 
for additional research:  
 
First, the neglect of poverty reduction and distributive effects of policies in the analysis of 
innovation systems. As I have shown in Chapter 1.1, innovation systems should, and partly 
do, pursue goals and set priorities that are different from those in rich countries. Poverty 
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reduction is a key concern, and poverty impact assessments should be part of any policy. 
Innovation necessarily involves “creative destruction” of less efficient organisations, which 
are likely to be the ones that are run by poor and unskilled people. This is not necessarily a 
bad thing if the displaced persons find new income-earning opportunities in more productive 
organisations; reality shows, however, that structural change is not a smooth process, and 
certain protection or support may be required to make it socially inclusive. Current research 
on innovation systems however is largely de-linked from the poverty reduction debate and 
only rarely addresses distributional aspects. Future research should correct this, focus more on 
questions of who benefits from innovations and how they affect the livelihoods of the poor. 
Of particular relevance is the phenomenon of stagnant productivity in the informal sector, 
Research is needed on the generation, absorption and diffusion of knowledge in informal 
firms and the barriers to knowledge transfer between formal and informal firms. 
 
Second, the lack of studies addressing the political economy of the public sector in 
innovation policy. Governments in developing countries are not only less effective on average 
than their counterparts in OECD countries, but they also show higher levels of favouritism 
and corruption. Innovation systems studies frequently claim a more active role for the public 
sector – without systematically addressing the risks of government failure. This reflects quite 
heroic assumptions about benevolent developmental states. More emphasis should therefore 
be given to analysing the political economy of  the public sector, e.g. looking into the trade-
offs between selective policies and favouritism, exploring ways of insulating policy 
formulation and implementation from rent-seeking, and investigating innovative mechanisms 
of service delivery through non-governmental channels or public-private partnerships.  
 
Third, the neglect of basic institutions of the market economy. Innovation systems research 
focuses on non-market (e.g. learning networks) rather than market institutions. The latter 
however explain a considerable part of the innovative performance of developing countries. 
Reforms are needed to improve financial sector governance, simplify business registration in 
order to speed up entry of firms; ensure competition; or to increase the flexibility of labour 
markets. More research is needed to understand how these institutions interact with national 
innovation systems and how they should be shaped to enhance technological learning. In a 
similar vein, innovation systems research emphasises selective policy instruments (e.g. 
specific sector policies, technology networks, incubators and science parks). Such policies 
often have limited outreach, benefiting relatively small groups of firms. Policies that improve 
the allocative efficiency of markets in general – e.g. the above reforms – in contrast can be 
expected to have nationwide impacts. This again calls for more research on the functioning of 
basic institutions of the market economy.  
    
As shown, the above misperceptions have led to partly inappropriate policy recommendations. 
Addressing these research gaps and correcting certain biases will increase both the 
explanatory power of innovation systems research and its relevance for policymaking in 
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Figure 1:  
Distribution of firms by level of productivity – model and evidence from developing countries    
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